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to be junked or repaired.'o Many of
these companies joined a "PRP group,"
which participated in negotiations with
the EPA." These negotiations, which
took place over approximately two
years, addressed the allocation of
cleanup costs at the MEW Site.12
The EPA presented all known PRPs
with
a proposed consent decree in Sep1
tember 1991. In order for a PRP to be
included in the proposed settlement a
response was required within sixty
days.' 3 InJune 1992, the EPA filed suit
by Erick Roeder
based on CERCIA §§ 106 and 107'4
against 179 PRPs who signed the proposed consent decree and agreed to
their toxicicity and persistence.s Prior to settle.15 The settlement decree required
1. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Missouri Electric Works Site the late 1970s, when PCB regulation the settling PRPs to contribute various
(MEW Site) in Cape Girardeau, Mis- began, coolant leaks and spills contain- amounts to the clean-up costs based on
souri was occupied by an electrical ing PCBs were common at the MEW an allocation formula arrived at during
6
the negotiations between the "PRP
equipment and repair shop for nearly Site.
2
In
the
early 1980s, the Environmental group" and the EPA.' 6 According to the
forty years. The shop's business during
this period included salvaging, repair- Protection Agency (EPA) discovered PCB Consent Decree, the settling PRPs would
ing, and selling transformers and other contamination at the MEW Site.' Inac- receive protection from contribution acelectronic equipment.3 Beginning in the cordance with the Comprehensive Envi- tions or claims, as provided by §
17
1950s, coolant oil, containing poly ronmental Response, Compensation, 11 3(f)(2) of CERCLA.
8
In November 1992, a group of
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), was used and Liability Act (CERCLA), the EPA
twelve
non-settling PRPs" moved to interidentified
approximately
735
potentially
in transformers to reduce the risk of fires
vene
in
this suit.
They claimed that
responsible
parties
(PRPs).'
These
parand explosions.' Although PCBs were
they
had
a
protectable
interest in preties
consisted
of
companies
that
had
an effective coolant, they presented a
serving
potential
contribution
claims
threat to the environment because of sold or sent used transformers to MEW

To INTERVENE OR NOT TO INTERVENE:
THE RIGHT OF NON-SETTLING PRPs TO
INTERVENE IN CERCLA LITIGATION

UNITED STATES V. UNION ELECTRIC Co.

United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152 18th Cir. 19951.
Id. at 1155.
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1fd.
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a 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
9

United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1155.

1n Id.
n
Id.
12 Id.
13

Id.

1 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606,9607 (1988).
"s United Stlates v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1155-56.
18 Id.atIll56.
17 Id. The statute reads, "a] person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State inon administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be
liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless its
terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of the setlement.- 42 U.S.C. § 9613[112) (1988).
1o United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1155. "The non-seilling PRPs are service shop owners who either sold electrical transformers direcily to MEW for
resale, sold transformers to third parties who resold them to MEW, or sent transformers owned by others to MEW for repair. However, the non-seilling PRPs did not
send any transformers to MEW to be scrapped or otherwise disposed of. .. .t[hey] assert that the allocation formula arrived at in these negotiations 'grossly
overstated' their potential liability, because itdid not allocale response costs ina way that reflected the comparative responsibililies of the various PRPs and did not
correlate costs of remedial action with contaminants contributed by the parties." Id.
19 Id.at 1156.
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against the settling PRPs and on interest

in fair apportionment of liability for the
"MEW clean-up.",20 They also asserted
that Fed. R.Civ. P. 24(a)21 and Section
11 3(i) of CERCLA 22 gave them a legal
right to intervene. 3 The district court
rejected these claims and denied the
non-settling PRPs' motion to intervene.2
The non-settling PRPs then brought an
appeal before the United Slates Court of
Appeals, Eighth Circuit. 5 This court reversed the district court's holding.26 It
held that when there is a suit by the EPA
against PRPs who agree to settle, and
the settling parties would thereby be protected from claims of PRPs who do not
wish to settle, the non-settling PRPs have
a legally protectable interest in a right to
contribution under CERCLA section
113(f)( 1).2' Thus, the non-settling PRPs
are given a right to intervene pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24" and CERCLA §
113(i)."

the environment,34 and to provide for the
The issue presented in United States cleanup of inactive hazardous waste
3
v. Union Electric Co. is whether non- sites. Congress based CERCLA on the
settling PRPs have a legal right to policy that taxpayers should not have to
intervene in an action by the EPA pay to protect the public from dangers
against settling PRPs based on the non- created by those who profit from busisettling PRPs' interest in preserving possi- nesses that deal with hazardous subInstead, Congress chose to
ble contribution claims and preventing stances.
place
this
burden
on those potentially
unfairly apportioned liability.o The
responsible
for
the
pollution through a
Eighth Circuit decided this issue as one
system
of
retroactive
strict liability.37 Unof first impression.
Decisions from
other jurisdictions result in a split of der this system, the EPA may require
authority on the issue.32 Although no PRPs to investigate and/or remediate
consensus has been reached, these deci- hazardous waste sites, or alternatively,
sions do provide insight as to how a may require PRPs to reimburse the EPA
Congress's
court faced with this issue should for taking such action."
two
purposes
in
enacting
CERCIA
were:
proceed.
(1) to promote prompt investigation and remediation of facilities
A. Rules and Statutes
or sites at which the release or
The Comprehensive Environthreatened release of hazardous
mental Response, Compensation and
substances presents a risk to
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)33 was
human health and the environenacted to provide a plan of action for
ment; and (2) to shift the costs
when hazardous substances escape into

11. LEGAL BACKGROUND

20 Id.
2

Id The Rule states that "lu]pon timely application anyone shall be permitted 10 intervene in an aclion: (1)when a statute of the United States confers an

unconditionol right 1o intervene; or (21 when the applicant claims on interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant

is-co situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest
isadequately represented by existing parties." FED.
R.CIV. P.24(a).
22 See intro note 50 and accompanying text.
23 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1156-57.
24 Id. at I 156 The district court gave two reasons for denying the motion. First, it stated that a "significantly proteciable interest" is not created
by a claim for
rervention under CERCIA § I I 311fl[
1). Therefore, intervention was not warranted. Second, the district court reasoned that the interest in contribution claims was
"too 'peculative and contingent" to support intervention. According to the court, this was because interest in contribution would arise only if future litigation was
commenced against she non-seilling PRPs and such litigation might or might not result in liability being placed on these PRPs. Id.
2 Id
26 Id at 117071.
2
fd at I 16667. The statute reads "[ainy person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this litle,
during or following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable
parlies using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for
contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(F][1) (19881.
21 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
2 Id.
3
United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1156.
31

Id.

32 Id. at 1163-64 (citing United States v. ABC Indus., 153 F.R.D. 603, 60708 (W.D. Mich. 19931; United States v. Wheeling Disposal Serv., Inc., No.
92M132CV-W-1, 1992 WI 685724 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 1, 1992); Uniled Slates v. Vasi, 22 Chem. Waste Lil. Rep. 218, 219 IN.D. Ohio 1991); United States v.
Beazer East Inc., 22 Chem. Waste Lil. Rep. 218, 222-23 (N.D. Ohio 19911; United States v. Mid-State Disposal, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 573, 57677 (W.D. Wis.
19901; United Slotes v. Acton Corp., 131 F.R.D. 431 (D.NJ. 19901).
" 2 U.S.C §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
'4 lynette Boomgaarden and Charles Breer, Surveying The Superfund Settlement Dilemma, 27 L(Ao& WAiR L.REv.
83, 84 (19921.
3 Id. at 84.
3 Id. (citing CONGFEss!oNw RESEARCH
SEcICE, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., EmmmEomw ANo NATURA
REsOURCEs
Policy DrvistoN, A LEGIstATIvE
HIsTORY OF TH COREHENSIVE
Euotvr.ENTAL RPspoNsE, Co:AFENsATONAN" ['lYACT OF 1980, 405 (Comm. Print 1983).
27 Jerome M Organ, Svperfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections on the Relationship Between Equity and Efficiency, 62 GEo. WAsH. L.
REv.
1043,
I04&48 (1994).
28 Id. at 10505 1.
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of investigating and remediating
such sites, whenever possible,
to the PRPs." 9
In its first attempts at implementing CERCIA, the EPA was unable to accomplish
either of these goals.40
In response, Congress passed the
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act (SARA) in 1986 to ensure the
quick and effective cleanup of hazardous waste sites.4 ' The 1986 Act added
several new sections to CERCIA. 4 2
These new sections create the following
step by step process which is used in the
settlement of CERCLA actions.
The EPA begins formal negotiations
by identifying PRPs and sending them
special notice letters.43 The PRPs then
have sixty days to organize themselves
and set forth a good faith proposal
which shows they are qualified and willing to conduct and pay for a Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Study.44 If a
"substantial portion" of the PRPs and the
EPA come to an agreement, the agreement is entered in the appropriate
United States district court as a proposed consent decree.4 s The EPA must
give public notice of the proposed consent decree by publishing it in the Federal Register.46 Following publication,
39

there is a thirty day period for public
comment.4 7 If there are comments indicating that the proposed agreement is
"inappropriate, improper, or inadequate," the EPA or the Attorney General
may withhold or withdraw consent to the
agreement."
If the Attorney General
and the EPA do not choose to withhold
or withdraw consent, the district court in
which the proposed consent decree is
filed may begin proceedings to finalize
the settlement.
Once such litigation begins, SARA
gives interested parties the right to intervene.4 " Section 113(i) provides:
In any action commenced under
this chapter or under the Solid
Waste Disposal Act in a Court
of the United States, any person
may intervene as a matter of
right when such person claims
an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action
may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the person's
ability to protect that interest,
unless the President or the State
shows that the person's interest
is adequately represented by
existing paries.50

This language is nearly identicals' to
the language of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(0),s2 so courts use virtually
the same test in deciding whether to allow intervention under section 11 3(i) as
they do when applying Rule 24 (a)."
This test has four requirements: 1) the
application for intervention must be
timely; 2) the applicant must have a recognized interest in the subject matter of
the litigation; 3) that interest must be at
risk of being impaired by disposition of
the litigation; and 4) the interest is not
adequately protected by existing
parties.S
Even though the purposes of Rule 24
and section 113(i) of CERCIA are so
similar, non-settling parties usually attempt to intervene under both. The reason for intervening under both is to
overcome the possible argument that
Congress did not intend section 113(i)
to be a means for non-settling PRPs to
challenge consent decrees.ss Section
159(h) of CERCLAs' states that CERCLA
will not impair any person's rights under
federal law. 57 Therefore, if a court finds
that non-settler intervention is not available under section II 3(i), intervention is
still possible under Rule 24(a)."
Although it is clear that, in some

Id.oa 1051-52.

Id. at 1052.
United Stares v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 1179-80 (3rd Cir. 1994)
Iciing H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99h Cong., 2nd Sess. 55 119861 reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2837).
42 United States v. Alcon, 25 F.3d at 1180.
a Boomgoarden and Breer, supro note 34, at 89.
" Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e12](A) 119881).
4
42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)[Al (1988).
4
Boomgoorden and Breer, supro note 34, at 89 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(i)(1) (988)).
o Boomgoarden and Breer, supro note 34, 01 89.
a Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(dli2)[B), (i][3) (1988)).
* United States v. Alcon, 25 F.3d af 1180.
* 42 U.S.C. § 96131i) (1988).
st The only distinction between ihe two provisions is ihat under Rule 24all2), the prospective intervenors have the burden
of proving that their interests are not
adequately protected by the existing ponies, while under section I131i), the burden of proof is placed on the government.
United
States v. Acton, 131 F.R.D. at
433.
S2 See supra note 21.
m United States v.Alcan, 25 F.3d at 1181 Iciling Utah v. Kennecoll Corp., 801 F.Supp. 553, 571-572 (D.Utah 1992);
Arizona v. Motorola, Inc., 139 F.R.D.
141, 144 (D.Ariz. 1991); United States v.Acton, 131 F.R.D. at 433).
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesola, 989 F.2d 994, 997 (8th Or. 19931 (citing Planned Parenthood
of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens for
Community Action, 558 F.2d 861, 869181h Cir. 19771).
- Boomgaarden and Breer, supro note 34, at 112 n.196.
36 42 U.S.C. § 9659h)(1988).
I Boomgaarden and Breer, supro nole 34, at 112 n.196.
58
4

Id.
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circumstances, parties may intervene in
a CERCIA actions, it is not yet determined whether a party's interest in contribution claims is enough to warrant
intervention in a CERCIA proceeding.s"
However, courts do seem to agree that
the four part test,W derived from Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), is the starting point for analysis of this issue.
B. Case Law
Indetermining whether to allow intervention, courts first determine whether
the intervention motion is timely.6' In
Mile Lacs Bond of Chippewa Indians, 62
a non-CERCIA intervention case, the factors for determining timeliness in the
Eighth Circuit were set out as follows:
the reason for delay in seeking intervention; how for the litigation had progressed before attempted intervention;
and how much prejudice other parties
would suffer if intervention isallowed. 3
Courts hearing CERCIA actions in
other jurisdictions have used different
factors in determining timeliness. In MidState Disposal," the court looked to:
the length of time the party knew or
should have known of the interest in litigation before attempting to intervene;
prejudice to litigating parties due to delay caused by intervention; prejudice to

the party attempting to intervene if intervention is denied; and any unusual circumstances in the case.6 5 In Mid-State,
the non-settling PRPs withdrew from settlement negotiations in May 19 8 9 .6 The

other parties settled, and the EPA filed a
complaint against the settlers and a proposed consent decree in November
1989.6' The non-settling PRPs did not
attempt to intervene until March 1990,
when the court heard the motion for entry of the consent decree.68 The court
found the delay excessive, holding that
the original parties would suffer preju-

dice because allowing intervention
would render the original negotiations
useless. 69 The court also found that the
intervenors would not suffer prejudice
because they could have voiced objections to the consent decree during the
period for public comment.70
In United States v. Browning-Ferris
Industries Chemical Services, Inc.,7' the
court considered the same factors as
Mid-State to determine timeliness. 72
However, in Browning-Ferris, the court
allowed intervention." In this case, notice of the proposed consent decree was
published on August 7, 1989, and application for intervention was filed on
September 8, 1989.' The government
argued that intervention should not be

allowed because of section 122(d)(2)(A)
of CERCLA, 75 requiring that application
be filed within thirty days. In allowing
intervention, however, the court reasoned that the statutory period was not
absolute.76
The general rule that can be extracted from Mid-State and BrowningFerris is that courts will consider an opplicant's attempt at intervention timely as
long as there is a showing of reasonable diligence on the part of the party
seeking intervention and as long as the
existing parties will not be prejudiced by
intervention. 7
Once a court decides whether a motion to intervene is timely, the next step is
to determine whether the party seeking
intervention has a legally protectable
interest in the litigation.78 Courts addressing the issue of whether an interest
in contribution claims is legally protectable have arrived at differing results. 9
In United States v. ABC Industries,s0 the
court found that an interest in contribution claims was not sufficiently protectable."i It reasoned that although the
interest did not appear to be "contingent
or speculative," it was subordinated by
CERCIA's policy of promoting early de
minimis settlements and final judgments
achieved through those settlements.

9 See supra note text accompanying note 49.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
61 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
62 See supro note 54 and accompanying text.
63 Mille locs, 989 F.2d of 998.
6
United States v. Mid-State, 131 F.R.D. at 573.
61 Id. at 576 (citing Bloomington Ind. v. Westingho use Elec. Corp., 824 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1987)).
66 Boomgoarden and Breer, supro note 34, o 113 (citing United States v. Mid-State, 131 F.R.D. at 576).
67
Id.
6

"
69
"

1

Id.o 114.
Id.

Id.

No. 89-568-A, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16596 [M.D.ta. Nov. 15, 1989).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74

Id.

n3 42 U.S.C. § 9622(dl21[A) (1988).
76 Browning-Ferris, No. 89-568-A, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16596 (M.D. La. Nov. 15, 1989).
7 Boomgoorden and Breer, supra note 34, of 114.
n See supro note 54 and accompanying text.
n9 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1157.
S0 United States v. ABC Indus., 153 F.R.D. of 603.
8' Id.ot 607-08.
s2 Id.
MELPR
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The importance of this policy has
been emphasized by many courts involved in CERCLA litigation. United
States v. Cannons Engineering Corp.8
was not a case involving an intervention
issue, but its holding is relevant to the
analysis of CERCLA intervention actions.
In Cannons, a group of non-settling PRPs
argued that the immunity from contribution claims granted to the settling PRPs
by CERCIA Section 113 (f)(2) would
result in a disproportionate allocation of
response costs." The non-settling PRPs
argued that this was "unfair and inconsistent with the statutory plan."-s The
court rejected this argument, stating that
although the immunity from contribution
claims granted to settling PRPs by Section 113 (f)(2) does create a risk of disproportionate liability, it is not
forbidden.86 In fact, the court held that
such disproportionate liability was an
integral part of the statutory plan designed to promote early settlements and
deter "litigation for litigation's sake."8
The court found that the risk of being
subject to disproportionate liability was
imposed on PRPs by Congress to encourage PRPs to take part in settlements."
The court's conclusions in Cannons seem
to suggest that the right to contribution
claims and fairly apportioned liability
are not legally protectable interests.
In United States v. Acton," the court
come to the opposite conclusion and

held that an interest in contribution
claims was sufficiently protectable to
The court
warrant intervention.9
granted the non-settling PRPs' right to
Section
pursuant to
contribution
The court
of CERCLA.'
113(f)(f1)
found that the right asserted by the nonsettling PRPs was not merely economic,
but a statutory right that might later be
"extinguished."9 Since this right to contribution was the only means by which
the non-setilers could be made whole, if
liability was imposed on them beyond
their "fair share," the court held that a
"substantial legally protected interest"
existed."
Once a court has determined that an
application to intervene in a CERCLA
action is timely and the intervenor has a
sufficiently protectable interest, the court
next must determine whether that interest
is at risk of being impaired by disposition of the litigation and whether the interest isadequately protected by existing
parties.9 s Both of these steps come into
play only after the court has determined
that a protectable interest exists. Therefore, Acton, being the only case to hold
that there is a legally protectable interest
in contribution claims in a CERCIA intervention action,96 provides the logical
guideline for a court applying these

82 899 F.2d 79 (1si Cir. 1990).

"

Id. as 92.
Id.
Id. a] 91.
Id. at 92.
Id.
United States v. Acton, 131 F.R.D. a 431.
Id.at 434.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(ij[21(1988).
United Staies v. Acton, 131 F.R.D. at 433.
Id. at 434.

9

Id.

9

See supra text accompanying note 54.

8

e
*6
7

s

8'
90
91
Q

*
*

United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1164.
United States v. Acton, 131 F.R.D. at 36.
"Id.

1w Id.
101 d

t02 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1152.
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Acton determined that allowing the litigation to proceed without intervention
would impair the non-settling PRPs'
"ability to protect that interest."9 The
court reasoned that approval of a consent decree would completely eliminate
the non-settling PRPs' contribution claims
against the settling PRPs."
Next, Acton addressed the question
of whether the non-settling PRPs' interest
was adequately represented by parties
already involved in the litigation." The
government argued that the non-settling
PRPs' interest was represented in the
consent decree proceedings because
the non-settling PRPs had submitted public comments on the matter.'" The court
rejected this argument, stating that representation must be provided "by existing
parties," and there was no party in the
litigation that represented the non-settling
PRPs.ioi

It is with the above legal background, consisting of the four part stalutory test and case law with varied
results, that the court in United States v.
Union Electric Co.i 2 set out to resolve
the question of whether to recognize a
right of non-settling PRPs to intervene in
CERCIA cases, based on an interest in
contribution claims and prevention of
unfairly apportioned liability.

requirements.

After concluding that the non-settling
PRPs had a legally protectable interest,

Ill. THE INSTANT DECISION
In the instant decision, the court

To Intervene or Not to Intervene
began its analysis by comparing Section
11 3(i) of CERCLA' 03 with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure

24

(a)."

Because of

the similarity in language between the
two provisions, the court found that the
some standards for intervention should
be used when analyzing CERCIA intervention cases as are used in intervention
cases under Rule 24(a).ios In addition,

the court found that the district court
erred by basing its decision on policy
considerations instead of the standards
for intervention outlined in Rule 24(a).i"
The court then proceeded to apply Rule
2 4(a)
standards to the facts of the present case.107
In examining the first step in the Rule
24 analysis of determining whether the
motion to intervene is timely,ios the court
noted that the key consideration is
whether the delay in moving for intervention will prejudice the existing parties.'oo
I1then stated that in this case any prejudice against the existing parties was not
due to delay by the non-settling PRPs."o
The court reached this result because,
although the motion to intervene was not
filed until almost four months after the
lawsuit began, litigation was still in its
early stages when the motion to
intervene was filed."'

The court found that the timeliness requirement protects against prejudice suffered as a result of delay in filing for
intervention, not from prejudice suffered
as a result of an intervenor's presence in
a lawsuit. 2 Therefore, it held that delay in entry of the Consent Decree was
not barred by the timeliness requirement
because this delay was not caused by
an untimely motion for intervention.' 13
After resolving that timeliness was not
a bar to intervention in this case, the
court turned to the question of whether
the non-settling PRPs had a recognized
interest in the subject matter of the litigalion." Despite the fact that the majority
of jurisdictions that had previously addressed this question answered in the
negative, the court held that non-settling
PRPs did have a legally protectable interest in contribution claims sufficient to
warrant intervention. 15 In reaching this
conclusion, the court rejected the lower
court's analysis which was based on
policy considerations and legislative intent.116 The court reasoned that, since
there was no ambiguity in the relevant
statutes, policy and legislative intent
should not be considered." 7
Therefore, the court based its arialysis on applying statutory provisions to

the facts of the instant case."
It first
examined CERCLA Section 113(f)(1)"'
and determined that the non-settling PRPs
were among those to whom the statute
granted a right of contribution.120 The
court next reasoned that, since this right
was asserted during the litigation and
arose from liability which would be a
result of the litigation, this right was directly related to the litigation. 2' Furthermore, the court noted that, because a
final settlement in this litigation would cut
off the non-settling PRPs' right to contribution under CERCLA Section 11 3(f)(2),' 22
the non-settling PRPs' interest in the subject matter of the litigation was "direct
and immediate." 23
After concluding that the non-settling
PRPs had a legally protectable interest,
the court addressed whether this interest
would be impaired by the litigation.124
It held that the interest in contribution
claims would be impaired because such
claims against the settling PRPs would be
barred or reduced in value under CERCIA Section 11 3(f)(2).' 25
Lastly, the court addressed whether
the
existing
parties
adequately
represented the non-settling PRPs. 12 6 The
court noted that generally potential intervenors must meet only a "minimal"

te2 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

United Stotes v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1157. See supra text accompanying note 21.
ins United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1158. The court noted one exception: Under § 113(i), the burden of showing [hot the prospective intervenors'
interest is adequotely represented by existing parties is p!oced on the President or the State, while under Rule 24[a) the prospective intervenor has the burden to show
that "no existing party adequately represents its interests." Id.
106 Id
toy Id.
'" See supro text accompanying note 54.
19 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1159.
104

" Id.
112 Id.

" Id.
"' Id. at 1160-65.

'is Id.at11t64-65.
116 Id.at 1165.
" Id.
11 Id. Gt 1166.
"1 See supro note 50 and accompanying text.
I" United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1166.
121 Id
'22 See supro note 17.
In United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1167.
124 Id.
125 Id.
MVELPR
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burden in showing inadequate representoion by existing parties. 21 7 However,
"where the state is a party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest, the
state is presumed to represent the interests of all of its citizens.""12 The court
noted that this presumption can be rebutted by showing that the potential intervenor's interest is not the some as the
interest shared by all of the citizens of
the state.1 29 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the potential intervenors had
a narrow and "parochial" financial
interest, while the general interest of citizens was in the cleanup of polluted
sites.i 30
The court rejected the EPA and settling PRPs' contention that the non-settling
PRPs' interest was adequately represented because the non-settling PRPs had
an opportunity to voice their arguments
through negotiations and public comment prior to the drafting of the consent
decree.'13 According to the court, this
argument was not on point because
"[t]he question is not whether the intervenors had any other way of protecting
their interests, but whether those interests
are protected in this litigation."i 3 2
The court further held that the non-

settling PRPs' interest was not represented by the parties involved in the litigation.133 It reached this conclusion by
comparing the interests of the EPA and
the settling PRPs with those of the nonsettling PRPs." 3 The court found that
since the settling PRPs wished to terminate the non-settling PRPs' contribution
claims, the interests of the two groups
Therefore, it would be imconflicted.'
possible for the settling PRPs to represent
the interest of the non-settling PRPs in the
136
litigation.
IV. COMMENT
A. Relation to Precedent
In United States v. Union Electric
Co., the court began its analysis by
looking to Section 113(i) of CERCIA 1 7
and Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of
The court used the
Civil Procedure.'
four part analysis derived from these provisions, which is used by virtually all
courts in deciding CERCLA intervention
cases.139 In its application of the second step of the analysis, the court
reached a different result from that
reached by most courts presented with
similar facts. Generally, courts have
found that non-settling PRPs do not have

a protectable interest in preserving potential contribution claims.140 This court,
however, followed the minority view and
held that non-settling PRPs do, in fact,
have such an interest. IA
In breaking from the majority view,
the court flatly rejected policy considerations and legislative intent as relevant
concerns. 14 2 Instead, [he court purported to use the plain language of the
statutes involved. 4 s It stated that because the statutory provisions which provide for intervention are unambiguous,
allowing intervention would not be "a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the framers."144 The court
stated that allowing intervention under
Section 113(i) of CERCLA14 S would not
preclude the effect of Section
I 3(f)(2). 46 Itwas because of this conclusion147 that the court decided not to
4
consider policy or legislative intent. O
When a statute is unambiguous
the courts should simply enforce it according to its plain language.14 9 However, in the instant case it is not clear
that the statutes are unambiguous. In
fact, the provisions of Section 11 3(i) are
in direct conflict with those of Section
113(f)(2) in the context of the present

Id.al 1168-70.
Id.at 1168.
128id. (ciling Mille lacs, 989 F.2d at 1000).
12 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1169.
130Id. (citing Mille Locs, 989 F.2d at 1001).
131 td.
1n id. Iciing Mille Iacs, 989 F.2d at 997-99).
I" United Staes v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d aI 170.
13 Id.aot 1169.
125 Id.at 1170.
136 Id.
1" See supro note 50 and accompanying text.
138 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1156-57. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
1" See supro text accompanying note 54.
1o See United States v. Alcan, 25 F.3d at 1174; United Slates v. ABC Indus., 153 F.R.D. at 607.08; United States v. Wheeling Disposal, No. 92-0132CV-W-1,
1992 WL 685724; United States v. Vasi, 22 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. at 219; United States v. Beozer East, 22 Chem. Waste tit. Rep. at 222-23; United States v.
MidSlate, 131 F.R.D. at 576-77.
142 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1164.
142 id.a 1165-66.
to3 id.alll1]65.
i Id. at 1166 (citing U.S. v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
in See supatextcaccompanying note 50.
t See-supro lexi accompanying note 125.
'4 United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1165-66.
148 id.at 1166.
in See Melohn v. Pennock ins., Inc., 965 F.2d 1497, 1502 (816 Cir. 1992).
126
127
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case. Allowing the non-settling PRPs to
intervene under 11 3(i) nullifies the incentive to prompt settlement created by Section 113(f)(2)'s protection against
contribution claims. When such a conflict exists, the majority view, which recognizes the conflict and then considers
the policies behind the statutes,150 is the
more sensible approach. Hence, in
cases in which non-selling PRPs attempt
to intervene in CERCLA actions, the plain
language approach is not the best.
B. Policy Considerations
When Congress enacted CERCLA in
1980, it had the dual policy concerns of
(1) promoting prompt investigation and
remediation of hazardous waste sites
and (2) shifting costs to PRPs.isi In
1986, Congress significantly changed
CERCLA by enacting SARA.' 52 The provisions of SARA were intended to further
encourage the thorough and rapid
cleanup of waste sites.153
The majority of courts considering
CERCIA cases give great weight to the
policies underlying both CERCLA and
SARA.'s" These courts place great importance on the incentive for quick settlement under section 11 3(f)(2) of CERCLA
which provides settling PRPs with immunity from contribution claims provided to
settling PRPs.i'
In United States v. Union Electric
Co., the court refused to consider the
policies underlying CERCIA.'" Instead,

the court read the plain language of the
statutes and concluded that intervention
by the non-settling PRPs was not

intervention is proper."
Since one of
the primary policies behind CERCIA is
to promote prompt response to hazardbarred.15 7
ous waste problems,163 courts should
The problem with this approach is attempt to reach results that are consisthat when a court looks to statutory lan- tent with this goal. When non-settling
guage alone, it has no context in which PRPs seek to intervene in CERCLA acto interpret that language. When read tions, the denial of intervention is the
in a sterilized, fact free environment, only result that is consistent with CERSections 1I3(i)"' and 11 3(f)(2)"s, of CIA's underlying policy.
CERCLA do not necessarily conflict.
Section 11 3(f)(2) simply provides protecC. Results and Ramifications
tion from contribution claims to settling
In United States v. Union Electric
PRPs, while Section 113(i) grants a right Co., the court found that Section
of intervention to interested parties. 113(f)(1) of CERCLAi" gave the nonHowever, when one party seeks inter- settling PRPs a legally protectable interest
vention in order to protect potential con- in contribution claims."
Based on this
tribution claims, a conflict is created. It finding, the court held that under Section
becomes unclear whether the settling 11 3(i) of CERCA, 1" the non-settling
PRPs' expectation of being free from con- PRPs were among those to whom CERtribution claims or the non-settling PRPs' CIA granted a right of intervention.' 67
interest in intervention should prevail. In By reaching this conclusion and allowUnited States v. Union Electric Co., the ing the non-settling PRPs to intervene in
court denied that such an ambiguity was this case, the court set a precedent that
created.W Therefore, the court refused will impact the settlement process in fu
to consider the policy underlying the ture Eighth Circuit CERCLA cases.
statutes. 161
The most significant impact of this
In the future, courts addressing cases decision will be its effect on EPA's ability
with facts similar to those in United to reach settlements with PRPs in a quick
States v. Union Electric Co. should rec- and effective manner. It is well acognize that a statutory ambiguity is cre- cepted that CERCLA's success is deoted when intervention is sought in order pendent on the voluntary settlement of
to protect contribution claims. In the PRPs.is6 Congress, realizing this fact as
face of such ambiguity, the accepted well, has provided incentives to encourcourse of action is to use policy and leg- age PRPs in CERCLA cases to enter setislative intent to determine whether tlement agreements.' 69 One of the

no See supro note 140 for a list of cases using this approach.
51 See supro lexi accompanying note 39.
's See supro note 41 and accompanying text.
'" See supro note 41 and accompanying text.
1" See supro text accompanying note 142.
I" See supro note 17 and accompanying text.
'" United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1165-66.
'
Id.at 1152
' See supro text accompanying note 50.
' See supro note 17 and accompanying text.
'" United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1152.
161 Id.
162 Chevron

U.SA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 11984).

16 United States v. Cannons, 899 F.2d at 90.

'" See supro text accompanying note 29.
165 See supro text accompanying note 120.
166 See supra note 50 and accompanying texi.
167 United States v. Union Eec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1159.60.
'68 Boorrgaarden and Breer, supra note 34, at 90.
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strongest of these incentives is provided
in Section 113(f)(2) of CERCLA,izo
which grants settling PRPs protection
from contribution claims brought by nonsettling PRPs.7'
Under Section
11 3(f)(2), PRPs who choose not to settle
are left with the possibility of being subject to a disproportionate share of liability. It has been held that such a
technique "which promotes early settlements and deters litigation for litigation's
sake, is an integral part of the statutory
plan."' 72
United States v. Union Electric Co.
effectively abrogates the primary incentive of Congress' plan. The court found
that the goal of Section 113(f)(2),
encouraging prompt settlement, will

169
170
in
172
173

remain intact if intervention is allowed
under Section 11 3(i)."" This conclusion
improperly ignores the fact that allowing
non-settling PRPs to intervene will impede
prompt settlement in CERCLA cases. Allowing non-settling PRPs to intervene to
protect contribution claims will eliminate
the incentive created by Section
113(f)(2). Settling PRPs will no longer
possess the security of knowing that they
are immune from contribution claims,
while non-settling PRPs will have the ability to wait until a proposed settlement is
under judicial review before asserting a
right to such claims. The main ramification of case law such as United States v.
Union Electric Co. is the prelongation of
CERCLA settlement litigation.

I.
See supro note 17 and accompanying text.
Boomgoorden and Breer, supro note 34, at 94.
United States v. Cannons, 899 F.2d at 92.
United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d of 1166.
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V. CONCLUSION
The majority view is that non-settling
PRPs do not have a right to intervene in
CERCLA actions in order to protect possible contribution claims against settling
PRPs. This view is supported by the policies and legislative intent underlying
CERCIA. By holding that non-settling
PRPs do have a right to intervene based
on their interest in protecting contribution
claims, United States v. Union Electric
Co. parts from the majority view and
sets a precedent which will hamper the
quick settlement of CERCIA actions in
the Eighth Circuit.

